Hassan H 2017 Isis May Be on Its Knees but It Will Rise Again if We Dont Break the Cycle

Abstract:The border region betwixt Iraq and Syria divided by the Euphrates River was long expected to be the Islamic Land's last stand up, simply many of its fighters there melted away instead. The available evidence suggests the withdrawals were part of a calculated strategy by the group afterwards the autumn of Mosul to conserve manpower and pin away from holding territory to pursuing an all-out insurgency. In the border region and across, the Islamic Country now seeks to mimic the strategy of compunction it so successfully adopted between its almost-defeat in the late 2000s and its territorial conquest of Syrian arab republic and Iraq in 2014.

In the fall of 2016, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi called on Islamic State fighters in Mosul to fight to the decease to defend the urban center.¹ They largely heeded his phone call. Thousands of fighters were killed, and when Mosul was liberated in July 2017, much of the city lay in ruins. Although the boxing in the Islamic State's second center of Raqqa was deadly and grinded on for iv months, the grouping made comparably less effort to defend it. The reality is that since losing Mosul, its most sizeable and symbolic territorial possession, the Islamic State has non fought to the last human being to maintain control of any other population center.

In Baronial 2017, the grouping melted away from Tal Afar rather than mount an all-out resistance against advancing Iraqi forces and Shi`a militias.ⁱⁱ In Raqqa, while foreign fighters fought fiercely against the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), hundreds of Syrian Islamic State fighters ultimately struck a deal in October to exist evacuated from the city.³ In Hawija, hundreds surrendered to nearby Kurdish forces after fleeing advancing pro-government forces.⁴

Fifty-fifty more than surprisingly, there was meek resistance in the Euphrates River Valley stretching betwixt towns such every bit Deir ez-Zor and Mayedin to the edge town of al-Qaim and into Anbar Province, which had become an increasingly important base of operations for the grouping. As information technology lost territory elsewhere, the arrangement had built up a meaning presence forth this stretch of the Euphrates,⁵ and many analysts and officials had expected it to dig in and strongly defend towns there under its control.^vi But in recent months, Islamic State forces largely melted away from towns and villages in the area rather than confront advancing Iraqi and Syrian forces.

While a loss of morale afterwards the fall of Mosul, the desire by less ideologically driven fighters to save themselves, and the degradation of control and command structures all contributed to some Islamic State fighters fleeing on certain fronts,⁷ the available prove suggests the withdrawals were function of calculated strategy by the group to conserve its forces and pivot away from property territory to pursuing an all-out insurgency. Islamic State leaders were predicting the need for this shift as early as May 2016,^eight and just weeks after the grouping lost Mosul, it called for this modify of approach in its official paper.

This article is divided into three sections. The first looks at the Islamic State'southward strategic retreat since the loss of Mosul. The second examines the group'due south pivot back to insurgency. The third looks at the group's likely strategy moving forward.

The Islamic State's Strategic Retreat
In July 2017, the Iraqi government formally announced the liberation of Mosul later on nine months of violent fighting.^ix By then, the battle to expel the militants from the group's second center, Raqqa, was already underway. A month later, the Islamic State lost Tal Afar, an iconic stronghold for the group from which several of the group'due south tiptop leaders hailed.^x By mid-Oct, the militants withdrew from Hawijah, their final stronghold in Kirkuk, and were expelled from Raqqa by the U.Due south.-backed SDF.

The vast surface area that the Islamic State had controlled in 2014 had been lost and, with it, the caliphate it created. The Islamic State's continuous territorial presence was now limited to the predominantly rural areas stretching from Haditha to the city of Deir ez-Zor. And even there, both Iraqi and Syrian forces had already begun campaigns to recapture those areas.

On September 9, 2017, the SDF announced the first of an offensive to expel the group from Deir ez-Zor Governorate in Syrian arab republic.¹¹ The timing of this push was in all likelihood accelerated because Russia-backed Syrian regime forces likewise started to advance into the governorate and and so on September 5 appear the breaking of a 3-year siege around Deir ez-Zor's provincial capital.¹² One of the The states' concerns was that Iranian-backed forces could advance toward the Iraqi border,¹³ close off the surface area, and potentially disrupt the SDF'southward ability to move south, as Iranian-backed groups did nearly the Iraqi-Jordanian border in May 2017.^xiv

Neither of the sides racing to take Deir ez-Zor seemed adequately prepared for the battle. This was evident, for example, in the counteroffensive that the Islamic Land conducted presently after Russia announced both an incursion into the city of Deir ez-Zor¹⁵ and an intention to cross the Euphrates River running upward the eastern edge of the urban center in an apparent effort to forestall any prospective advances by the SDF to control the eastern side of the river.¹⁶ Within hours of the Islamic State's counterattack, several of the areas the Assad regime had secured since March 2017 temporarily fell to the group.¹⁷

Syria and Iraq (Brandon Mohr; service layers from Esri, USGS, DigitalGlobe, and NOAA)

In the months leading up to the September 2017 "race for Deir ez-Zor," a division of labor between Russian federation and Iran enabled Syrian forces to open up a supply line into the city of Deir ez-Zor, which had been nether siege since 2014 by the rebels and Jabhat al-Nusra and so the Islamic Country.^xviii In the spring of 2017, Islamic republic of iran expanded its support for the ground campaign to seize outposts in the road networks along the way from the Syrian desert near Palmyra.^xix Russia and Iran established a sprawling corridor throughout the Syrian desert to enable the expansion of authorities loyalist forces inside Deir ez-Zor and to open upward the possibility of moving on the Islamic State-held boondocks of Mayedin xxx miles southeastward forth the Euphrates River and the oil-rich countryside on the eastern side of the river.

During the course of September 2017, however, the rhythm of the Russia-backed offensive was initially disrupted past the Islamic State's counterattacks in the desert areas stretching from Palmyra to the Iraqi border, thus demonstrating the fragility of months-long advances. However, the Syrian forces regained command of the areas they lost and began, within three weeks,²⁰ to advance into Deir ez-Zor and Mayedin from the west side of the Euphrates.

On the opposite side of the river, the SDF, which launched its campaign in Deir ez-Zor in a push button southward from Shaddadi in southern Hasakah, continued to march s along the areas east of the river. By the end of October 2017, the Islamic State had ceded control of the cities of Mayedin and Deir ez-Zor to the regime and its allies.²¹ The SDF, for its part, announced its command of oil and gas facilities east of Mayedin.²²

Russia lost the race to cross the river before the SDF arrived, thus failing to reach the Iraqi borders through Mayedin, which initially seemed to be an Iranian objective. Similarly, the U.S.-backed forces lost the race to control the city of Mayedin, which officials had indicated was coveted past the international coalition as a potential source of valuable intelligence given the perceived status then of the urban center as a middle for the Islamic State.²³

In the meantime, Iraqi forces had conducted a series of shaping operations since July to expel the Islamic State from its remaining strongholds in Anbar. An offensive to liberate the edge town of al-Qa'im and next towns was formally announced in mid-September, starting from 'Ana in September²⁴ and ending with the capture of Rawa and al-Qa'im in November 2017.²⁵ On the Syrian side of the border, Iranian-backed militias as well announced the expulsion of the Islamic State from the border town of Abu Kamal at the aforementioned time, on November 8, 2017.²⁶

Past this point, in that location were signs of a change of strategy by the Islamic Land. The change was axiomatic in areas previously idea to be central strongholds for the group, such as Mayedin, Abu Kamal, and al-Qa'im. Mayedin, specifically, had for months been regarded as having replaced Raqqa as the grouping'south administrative center in Syria. In April 2017, the International Center for the Study of Trigger-happy Extremism published a report indicating that the Islamic State's administrative cadres in Raqqa had left the urban center and relocated to Mayedin. The written report, citing local sources, claimed that financial revenues in Raqqa were transported to Mayedin.^{27 a} The Financial Times ran a similar report²⁸ suggesting that locals in Raqqa noticed that militants of a sudden vanished from the city. A month earlier, U.S. officials told The New York Times that the group'due south top commanders and authoritative personnel fled Raqqa and gathered in the borderlands in Iraq and Syria.²⁹ In some other report in July 2017, The New York Times reported:

"Many have relocated to Mayadeen, a town 110 miles southeast of Raqqa about oil facilities and with supply lines through the surrounding desert. They accept taken with them the group's most of import recruiting, financing, propaganda and external operations functions, American officials said. Other leaders have been spirited out of Raqqa by a trusted network of aides to a string of towns from Deir al-Zour to Abu Kamal."³⁰

It was just non Mayedin that had emerged as a primal town for the group. A few dozen miles along the Euphrates River, Abu Kamal and al-Qa'im had too long been the center of some of the group'due south administrative work, even before Mosul and Raqqa came under attack. In these two towns, the Islamic State had created the merely wilayat (province) that was formed by combining 2 Iraqi and Syrian cities, dubbed Wilayat al-Furat, or the Euphrates Province.

In this wilayat, propaganda content appeared to take been handled more centrally than anywhere else in the fading caliphate. Videos frequently addressed themes related to the full general state of the caliphate, including the first of nearly twenty coordinated videos to show solidarity to Wilayat Sinai in Arab republic of egypt in May 2016³¹ and one featuring Uighur fighters taking a jab at the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), a Uighur jihadi group in Syria aligned with al-Qa`ida.³² Attesting to its importance to the Islamic State, Wilayat al-Furat was likewise where the United states and Iraq frequently report airstrikes, which kill senior members.³³

The Islamic State's presence in that region, combined with aforementioned assertions past local sources and U.Due south. officials, underscored the significance of these borderlands to the group as hideouts and a potential base for future operations. These areas had become the centre of the Islamic State's remaining concentration of forces, including dice-hard foreign and local fighters and key commanders preserved from previous battles.³⁴ By the late summertime of 2017, they also featured at least 550 confirmed fighters who were given a gratis passage and had traveled from Lebanon and Raqqa in deals with Hezbollah³⁵ and the SDF,³⁶ respectively.

Only despite its supposed significance, Mayedin fell virtually abruptly and with footling fighting in Oct 2017. Local sources speaking to Deirezzor24,³⁷ a grassroots organization specializing in documenting violations past both the regime and jihadis, denied the city was retaken by forces loyal to Assad. The authorities, uncharacteristically, produced little footage to prove information technology recaptured a fundamental metropolis. The local skepticism was an indication that the sudden withdrawal from the city was surprising to locals,³⁸ who, along with U.S. officials, had reported that the city had go a center for the group after it came nether assault in Raqqa.

Islamic State fighters also appear to have melted away in Abu Kamal and al-Qa'im, the edge towns facing each other in Syrian arab republic and Iraq, respectively. Subsequently earlier shaping operations past Iraqi forces, the push onto the city of al-Qa'im³⁹ was relatively swift. Similarly, the Syrian regime and Iranian-backed militias announced they had recaptured Abu Kamal shortly subsequently a campaign to fight the group there was launched.⁴⁰

Finally, afterwards the supposed defeat of the militants in Abu Kamal, which the Islamic State denied, the regime and its allies alleged the end of the group in Syria on November ix, 2017.⁴¹

The Islamic State'southward Pivot to All-Out Insurgency
With the autumn of Mosul in the summer of 2017, the writing was on the wall for the Islamic State's caliphate. Despite the weakness of the Islamic State, even so, many analysts were surprised by the speed of its sudden subsequent retreats in such places every bit Tal Afar, Hawija, and even Raqqa, despite fierce initial resistance there. Even more surprising was its retreat in areas long perceived to be its strategic base of operations—the borderlands and the Euphrates River Valley, where it had feel fighting or operating in for effectually a decade and where it reemerged in 2014.

The expectation, even in U.S. government circles, was that it would have another yr to miscarry the Islamic Land from areas information technology still controlled such as Deir ez-Zor and Anbar since the militants were regrouping there. Likewise, the grouping had fought fiercely in recent battles such as in Raqqa before it began to withdraw swiftly and almost all of a sudden from various strongholds with trivial fighting.

1 possible explanation could be constitute in the Islamic State'due south own publications. Al-Naba, the weekly newsletter issued by the Islamic State's Central Media Department, hinted at a major alter of strategy in a series of articles published between September and October 2017 on the topic of dealing with the U.Due south. air campaign. In a series of two reports in September 2017,⁴² the newsletter explained that Islamic State militants, having suffered heavy losses, especially in Kobane, were debating how to evade the "precision" of U.South. air forces in the face of footing assaults on multiple fronts. These fronts included the disguising of weaponry and engaging in military deception. The commodity concluded that it would be a mistake for the Islamic State to proceed engaging forces that enjoy air back up from the United states of america or Russia because the function of these forces was not to serve equally conventional fighting forces, but mainly to provoke the militants and expose their whereabouts and capabilities for drones and aircraft to strike them. In order to foreclose the depletion of its forces by air power, the article pushed for the Islamic Land to adopt a counter-strategy in which information technology would refrain from sustained clashes in urban centers with its enemies as information technology did formerly. Given that the Islamic State quickly retreated from urban areas in places such as Tal Distant and Hawija in the weeks post-obit the liberation of Mosul, it is probable the article reflected a change in strategy by the Islamic State's leadership after the loss of Republic of iraq's second largest metropolis in July 2017.

This modify of tactics was also reflected in the early stages of the battle of Raqqa, where, as Al-Naba revealed, the urban center was divided by the Islamic Country into pocket-size, self-sustained, and autonomous localities to enable militants to defend their areas with minimal movement and without the need for resupply from other districts.⁴³ The Islamic State allowed these small groups of fighters in Raqqa to make democratic decisions dictated by their ain circumstances and needs. According to the Al-Naba article,⁴⁴ another precaution in Raqqa and more than generally was to avoid gathering in large numbers at the entry points of a battlefield, which would be typically bombed to pave the way for ground forces to advance and position themselves in an urban environment. "In modernistic wars, with precision weapons, anybody tries to avoid direct engagement with his enemy to minimize losses," stated the article.

In another report, issued in Al-Naba on October 12, 2017,⁴⁵ the Islamic State suggested that information technology had once again been forced to switch to insurgency tactics like in the leap of 2008 under the leadership of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and his state of war minister Abu Hamza al-Muhajir. The article related how the group's predecessor, the Islamic State of Iraq, had been forced to dismantle its fighting units in March 2008 and pursue a dissimilar strategy to preserve what was left of its manpower. Providing details never before disclosed, it described how the Islamic State of Iraq had get exhausted and depleted after ii years of vehement fighting against U.S. and Iraqi troops to the point that it was no longer able to stand and fight for long. "In early 2008, it became clear that information technology was impossible to continue to appoint in conventional fighting. That was when Abu Omar Al Baghdadi said: 'We at present have no identify where we could represent a quarter of an hour.'"⁴⁶The commodity argued the situation was now comparable and that this justified a switch of approach.

In fact, in its new iteration, well earlier it lost Mosul, the Islamic Country had increasingly transitioned to insurgency tactics. General Joseph Votel, commander of U.S. Fundamental Control, told reporters in May 2016 that the Islamic State "may be reverting in some regards back to their terrorist roots."⁴⁷ As noted at the time by this author, in the early months of 2016, the grouping stepped upwards hit-and-run attacks in towns it had lost, without indications that the limited number of militants involved in these operations sought to regain control of the towns.^b The tactic diverged from the group's trend at the height of its expansion in 2014 to engage in conventional attacks, including attacks via convoys and artillery barrage. The new tactics tended to involve small units attacking from behind enemy lines or through hasty raids.⁴⁸ The Islamic State at the fourth dimension could exist described as pursuing a hybrid strategy of territorial command and insurgency tactics.

The group likewise mounted attacks in areas information technology previously failed to enter as an ground forces, such as in Abu Ghraib⁴⁹ but to the westward of Baghdad and in the littoral region in western Syria.^l Reverting dorsum to the sometime insurgency and terror tactics enabled the Islamic Land to penetrate otherwise well-secured areas. Previous attempts to assail them through conventional fighting units had failed, even while the group was at the height of its ability.

By the spring of 2017, these new tactics, combined with its continued command of territory, raised questions among U.South. officials nearly the versatility and adjustability of allied Iraqi and Syrian forces⁵¹ and the kind of training they received relative to that of the Islamic Land. As i senior U.S. official conceded to the author in May 2017, it was not nonetheless possible to focus on dealing with insurgency tactics as the grouping still controlled significant sanctuaries.⁵²

The Islamic Land'southward reversion to insurgency tactics increased as information technology lost more territory. Hit-and-run attacks and notable assassinations returned to newly liberated areas, such equally in Salah advertisement-Din, Diyala, Anbar, and Raqqa,⁵³ although such attacks were rarely accounted for in official and public statements related to progress confronting the grouping.

In Iraq, the return of the Islamic State'southward activities to liberated areas was recognized long earlier the grouping lost Mosul. In October 2016, as Iraqi troops prepared for the battle in Mosul, Iraqi officials told Al Sumaria TV that the group had already begun to recruit new members among displaced civilians in areas secured since late 2014 in Samarra, in Salah advertising-Din Province.⁵⁴ Officials' fears were triggered by new findings by local intelligence and a series of suicide attacks in areas betwixt the Balad District and Samaraa,⁵⁵ which officials attributed to the inability of security forces to hold and secure the liberated areas, especially near the Tigris River. "We use ambushes, but information technology is non plenty because that requires the back up of a whole brigade," Muhammad Abbas, the commander of the Sixth Brigade of Hashd al-Shaabi, or the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), told Al Sumaria. Another official, Hayder Abdulsattar of the Iraqi government's military machine intelligence, told the channel that the group'due south numbers and activities were growing again and, along with sleeper cells, facilitating the movement of its operatives across the river.

The render of Islamic State's activities in such areas was also reflected in multiple videos released by the group, focusing on hitting-and-run attacks as well every bit assassinations of key security cadres. For example, Wilayat Salah advertizement-Din released a video in May 2016 entitled "Craft of State of war," in which, seeking to replicate its previous comeback, it addressed how much the group's new leadership had absorbed skills obtained from founding leaders like Abu Abdulrahman al-Bilawi, who planned the Mosul takeover earlier he was killed in June 2014.⁵⁶ The xxx-minute video showed operations targeting "the enemy's rear lines" in the province, on the Bayji-Haditha road, between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, as well as inside the city of Tikrit.

As in other combat videos posted by the Islamic State in recent months, the video details various attacks, the dispersing of the enemy, and the seizure of artillery and vehicles from the bases of enemy forces before withdrawal. The video featured the killing of the Tikrit's counterterrorism master along with 31 people, including 14 policeman, after seven Islamic State fighters entered the city's cardinal Zuhur Commune wearing suicide vests and police uniforms and riding a police motorcar, earlier storming the counterterrorism chief's firm.⁵⁷ The commentator in the video then claimed the attacks demonstrated the electric current leadership's ability to plan and execute attacks as the old guard had done years previously when information technology brought the group to life afterward information technology was thought to be finished.

"These operations brought to heed the planning of the Islamic State's early on leaders. The qualitative operations in Tikrit, Bayji, al-Siniyyah, Samaraa, and others … are an extension of the methodology of the commanders and leaders who had previously led the war of attrition and kept the enemy occupied, and who laid the groundwork for a long war. Men of honesty carried the banner after them to destroy their enemy, and the first sign of glad tidings appeared at their hands (showing) that Salah Ad Din was and remains a deterring place for the apostates."

Equally noted before this year past Michael Knights in this publication, the Islamic State was already involved in intense insurgent operations in several parts of the country a yr after it declared a caliphate, and especially in Diyala Province, with a level of violence in June 2017 around the same level as in 2013. In fact, in Diyala, which was never overrun past the Islamic State, an insurgency confronting Shi`a militia forces had been gathering step since 2015.⁵⁸ Knights' research pointed to a full-fledged insurgency in the province led from the adjacent ungoverned space of the Islamic State pocket north of the Diyala River. "The insurgency has attained a steady, consequent operational tempo of roadside IED attacks, mortar strikes and raids on PMF outposts, and attacks on electrical and pipeline infrastructure," Knights wrote. He added, "In Diyala, the Islamic State is already engaged in the kind of intimate violence that was seen across northern Iraq in 2013: granular, high-quality targeting of Sunni leaders and tribes working aslope the PMF."⁵⁹

There accept been similar patterns of insurgent operations over the past two years in the borderlands straddling Republic of iraq and Syria, where the group benefits from a geographic and social terrain that is hard for counterinsurgents. In contempo months, Islamic State fighters accept carried out several striking-and-run attacks on military machine bases in the area too as killed several loftier-ranking Iranian^threescore and Russian officers.⁶¹

The Islamic Land's Post-Caliphate Strategy
The Islamic Country'southward apparent decision to conserve forces for insurgency in the region stretching from Deir ez-Zor Governorate in Syria to Anbar Province in Iraq makes strategic sense given it has ofttimes highlighted the area as key to its survival and best suited for the base of a guerrilla war. For the Islamic State, rural- and desert-based insurgency is no less of import than urban warfare to deplete its enemies, recruit members, and lay the groundwork for a comeback. The geographic and human terrain of the region provides the jihadis with an area in which they can regroup, run sleeper cells, rebuild finances through extortion, and plot attacks.

The Islamic State has repeatedly stressed the demand for a desert strategy in the example of the demise of its territorial caliphate.⁶² This desert campaign will likely be concentrated in an area extending from Nineveh to Anbar provinces in Iraq to the metropolis of Palmyra in Syria. The group began to articulate its mail service-caliphate strategy publicly and in earnest in May 2016⁶³ when its old spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, gave his last speech before he was killed in Syria in tardily August. In his remarks, al-Adnani prepared followers for the fall of "all the cities" under the group'south control.⁶⁴ Throughout the voice communication, he depicted the rise and fall of his grouping every bit part of a historical flow, continuing—as a deliberate process—from the early days of the Iraq War until at present.⁶⁵ Territorial demise, he made clear, was merely the beginning of a new chapter in which the process of depleting the enemy does not get disrupted but persists in different forms. If and when a new opportunity for some other rise presented itself, his logic went, the process of depletion volition have laid the groundwork for a deeper influence than the previous round.

"Exercise y'all think, O America, that victory is accomplished past the killing of ane commander or more? Information technology is then a false victory … victory is when the enemy is defeated. Do you think, O America, that defeat is the loss of a metropolis or a land? Were we defeated when we lost cities in Iraq and were left in the desert without a city or a territory? Will we be defeated and you will be victorious if you lot took Mosul or Sirte or Raqqa or all the cities, and we returned where we were in the showtime stage? No, defeat is the loss of willpower and desire to fight."⁶⁶

In the months afterwards the speech communication, the Islamic State began to talk about the desert every bit a viable place to launch its post-caliphate insurgency. Its propaganda has since prominently featured desert combat. Through such messages, the grouping hopes to show information technology can still inflict damage on government forces in remote areas and on critical highways linking Syria and Hashemite kingdom of jordan to Iraq and to depict parallels to the fact that the concluding time the system was deemed defeated in Iraq, in the late 2000s, it came dorsum stronger than ever.

In August 2016, an editorial published in Al-Naba echoed the former spokesman's statements almost how the group understands its history. In the editorial, the authors summed upwardly the grouping'due south strategy later its expulsion from erstwhile strongholds in Iraq in the wake of the U.S. troop surge with the support of Sunni tribesman:

"In the years that followed the rise of Sahwa⁶⁷ [Sunni collaborators] in Republic of iraq, the mujahideen retreated into the desert after leaving behind tens of concealed mujahideen from among the security squads [i.e., sleeper cells], which killed, inflicted pain, drained, and tormented them, and dislocated their ranks, and exhausted their regular army, police, and their security apparatus, until God willed that the Knights of the Desert render to storm the apostates within their fortresses later on they had worn them out through kawatim [gun silencers], lawasiq [sticky bombs], and martyrdom operations."

It appears that a key target for the Islamic State every bit it reembraces insurgency are Sunnis opposing its worldview. In its recent propaganda, the Islamic Country has focused on the role of fellow Sunni collaborators in its demise in the late 2000s and has vowed to continue up the pressure against emerging ones. Information technology is interesting that "Sahwat" was originally restricted to the tribal Awakening Councils⁶⁸ established in Iraq to fight al-Qa`ida during the 2007 troop surge,⁶⁹ only the group has since broadened the reference to mean opponents and collaborators from within Sunni communities writ large. As the group retreats from its strongholds, its propaganda focuses on targeting Sunni collaborators to prevent the institution of culling local structures that appeal to local communities in predominantly tribal and rural areas.

This fear of a Sunni or local alternative shows clearly in the grouping'south rhetoric. "America was defeated and its army fell in ruins, and began to plummet had it non been salvaged by the Sahwa of treason and shame," al-Adnani stated in his May 2016 voice communication. One article in Al-Naba warned young man Sunnis that the Islamic State's mafariz amniyah, or secret security units, had since become even more practiced in "the methods of deceiving the enemy and disappointment its security plans."⁷⁰

The group's recent rhetoric echoes a strategy it expressed in a 2010 document entitled the "Strategic Plan for the Consolidation of the Political Standing of the Islamic State of Iraq,"⁷¹ a key attempt at "lessons learned" from its near defeat and how to recover. The analysis and prescription in the document defined the grouping's strategy, and the success of that strategy subsequently has come up to define how the group perceives its chances of recovery today.

Information technology is worth, therefore, examining the 2010 certificate in some particular, as it appears the grouping believes what worked earlier will work again. It suggested three courses of action for the group'southward clandestine entrada. The first focused on targeting Iraqis enrolling in the military machine and police force forces, peculiarly Sunnis, and proposed "ix bullets for the apostates and i bullet for the crusaders," accompanied by "soft" propaganda to portray enrollment in country agencies as both socially shameful and religiously sinful. The second proposed tactic was to target security bases and gatherings, deplete the regime forces, divert their attention, and increase the group'south influence and mobility in equally many areas as possible to launch stronger attacks in a wider surface area. In this context, the authors cited Sun Tzu's maxim "reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; and brand trouble for them, and keep them constantly engaged." The third proposed course of activity was to focus assassination attacks on disquisitional cadres within the security forces, including operationally constructive officers, engineers, and trainers. These cadres were critical to Iraqi security forces' efforts and difficult to supersede, the document explained, because of their high skills.

The goal of the proposed strategy was to deplete the enemy and preempt any effort to create security or social structures capable of entrenching the political guild established in Baghdad and challenging the presence of jihadis. The campaign of incessant attacks to debilitate the enemy, which Islamic Land of Iraq fighters launched inside Iraq, is a process jihadis refer to as nikayah, or war of compunction. This has again emerged as the organizing principle of the Islamic State's insurgent entrada.

In its publications most operations in Anbar and other areas, the Islamic State often makes a reference to the "brittleness" of the defenses inside towns the grouping previously controlled, equally it did in the Salah advertisement-Din video. In Nov 2016, Al-Naba ran an article⁷² about a hit-and-run attack it had conducted the month before in Rutbah,⁷³ a strategically located town in western Republic of iraq on the road that connects Baghdad to Amman, Jordan. According to Al-Naba, the militants stormed the city from three sides, with xx to 30 fighters attacking from each. More than 100 local militiamen and army soldiers were claimed to have been killed after the attackers temporarily took command of the town and seized weaponry and vehicles before they withdrew. The authors wrote, "The operation to command Rutbah showed the brittle state of the areas from which the Islamic State has withdrawn, and the power of the soldiers of the caliphate to recapture them with ease and with small groups of mujahideen."

The newsletter claimed that the metropolis's defenses were concentrated on the outer parts and that about of the boondocks savage after these were overrun, inside iv hours of clashes. A series of attacks in the previous months had made it easier for the Islamic Country to recapture the boondocks temporarily. Al-Naba explained the efforts at depleting the enemy in the following terms:

"Whole convoys were destroyed in more one occasion, which acquired great depletion of the apostates, the killing of hundreds of their members, the destruction of tens of their vehicles and bases, and disturbed the military presence of the Rafidah in the area, and caused a state of confusion inside their ranks, factors that paved the mode for the storming and recapturing of the metropolis."⁷⁴

Syraq every bit the New AfPak
Even though the Islamic State has suggested it could withdraw to the desert, its attacks volition yet focus on urban centers, with rural areas equally pathways allowing mobility between the two terrains. Headquartered in the desert or hidden in populated areas, the Islamic State aims to run a far-reaching and ceaseless insurgency in rural areas and urban centers to deter and stretch thin its opponents and to abrade whatever emerging governance and security structures in areas it previously controlled. Hit-and-run attacks aim to demonstrate that cypher is out of reach for the militants, even if their ability to command territory plummets.

The border region between Republic of iraq and Syria will probable exist cardinal to this strategy. In this region—an archipelago of desert areas, river valleys, rural towns, and small urban centers—jihadis could exploit favorable socio-political conditions that once enabled the Islamic Land and its predecessors to take root and reemerge from defeat. It is in this region that recent security gains are almost tenuous because Iranian-backed militias were allowed to coil into Sunni heartlands⁷⁵ and Shi`a and Kurdish militias were used to push out the Islamic Land.

The Islamic State itself, in a number of recent videos, highlighted the axis of this area to its resurgence in 2014. 1 video, for example, relayed the story of two local commanders from Anbar who, having learned from founding commanders such equally Abdulrahman al-Bilawi, descended from desert camps where they had been based for years to lead operations in Anbar and Nineveh, which led to the capture of several cities and large tracts of territory in the summer of 2014.

In its new insurgent campaign, the Islamic State has both headwinds and tailwinds. The headwinds include the fact that its barbarous occupation of large parts of Syria and Iraq volition not soon be forgotten by much of the local population. But information technology however has the tailwind of the continuing Syrian ceremonious state of war, which provides a broader theater in which it can operate than it had in 2010 when its leaders were mapping out their route to recovery. In Syria today, the group has connected to benefit from political grievances and the anger caused by raging violence. And it still tin take advantage of rough terrain extending from the Syrian desert to the deserts near Anbar and Nineveh in its at present full pivot to a campaign of terrorism and insurgency.

This contiguous terrain in Iraq and Syria is akin to the region along the Afghan-Pakistani border that previous U.S. administrations dubbed "AfPak" and treated as a single theater requiring an integrated arroyo. The "Syraq" space, which stretches from the areas most the Euphrates and Tigris river valleys in northern and western Iraq to Raqqa and Palmyra, looks set up to be to the Islamic State what AfPak has been to the al-Qa`ida and Taliban factions, providing a hospitable environment and strategic sanctuaries. And by conserving fighters rather than fighting to the death in the battles that followed Mosul, the Islamic Land still has significant manpower to sustain a campaign of terrorism and insurgency in the surface area. Whether the United states of america and the coalition that took away the Islamic State'south territorial caliphate have a counter strategy that takes into account the local reality in that region volition exist the difference between success and failure in truly defeating this organization. CTC

Hassan Hassan is a senior young man at the Tahrir Institute for Eye East Policy, focusing on militant Islam, Syria, and Iraq. He is the co-author of ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, a New York Times bestseller chosen every bit ane of The Times of London'south Best Books of 2015 and The Wall Street Journal's top 10 books on terrorism. Hassan is from eastern Syria. Follow @hxhassan

Substantive Notes
[a] U.S. officials told CNN in May 2017 that they believed the Islamic State had moved all of its chemic weapons experts to the area between Mayedin and al-Qaim and that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and thousands of Islamic State operatives and supporters might be in the area. Ryan Browne and Barbara Starr, "ISIS creating chemical weapons cell in new de facto capital, US official says, CNN, May 17, 2017.

[b] In an article on the purpose of hitting-and-run attacks a year later, the Islamic State explained such attacks aim to continue the enemy weak and preoccupied as the enemy has to maintain reinforcements along territories to prevent infiltration past the militants. The article further explained that militants involved in hit-and-run attacks, which the group refers to as sawlat, typically numbering anywhere between five and 15, should withdraw quickly before airstrikes are called in. "It is a method of attrition, not aimed at winning or holding territory," the article stated. Al-Naba, edition 100, "Military Sawlat: their conditions and effect on the enemy," July 31, 2017, p. 14.

Citations
[1] Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, "This is what Allah and His Messenger had Promised Us," Nov two, 2016.

[2] Tamer El-Ghobashy and Mustafa Salim, "Little resistance equally Iraq wins boxing for Tal Distant," Washington Post, August 27, 2017.

[3] "Raqqa's dirty surreptitious," BBC, November 13, 2017.

[iv] "Hundreds of suspected Islamic State militants surrender in Iraq: source," Reuters, October x, 2017.

[5] Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, "Officials Middle Euphrates River Valley as Last Stand for ISIS," New York Times, August 31, 2017.

[vi] Author interview, anti-Islamic State coalition's senior official, July 2017.

[seven] Martin Chulov, "Losing ground, fighters and morale – is it all over for Isis?" Guardian, September vii, 2016.

[8] Hassan Hassan, "The Islamic Country Later Mosul," New York Times, Oct 24, 2016.

[9] "Battle for Mosul: Iraqi PM Abadi formally declares victory," BBC, July 10, 2017.

[10] Hamdi Alkhshali, Laura Smith-Spark, and Mohammed Tawfeeq, "Republic of iraq prime minister: Tal Distant 'liberated' from ISIS," CNN, August 31, 2017.

[11] "U.S.-backed forces, Syrian army accelerate separately on Islamic Country in Deir al-Zor," Reuters, September viii, 2017; "US-backed SDF launches offensive in Syria's Deir ez-Zor," Rudaw, September 9, 2017.

[12] Author interview, U.S. Department of Defence force official, September 2017; Hilary Clarke and Tamara Qiblawi, "Syrian forces break ISIS' siege of Deir Ezzor," CNN, September 5, 2017.

[13] Fabrice Balanche, "The Race for Deir al-Zour Province," Washington Institute, Baronial 17, 2017.

[14] "Islamic republic of iran changes grade of road to Mediterranean coast to avoid US forces," Guardian, May 16, 2017.

[15] Bethan McKernan, "Isis kills 128 civilians in 'revenge' surprise counter assail on Syrian town," Independent, Oct 23, 2017.

[16] "Russian pontoon bridges to help Syrian Army cross the Euphrates," Almasdar News, September 13, 2017.

[17] Bethan McKernan, "Isis retakes boondocks 200 miles into Syrian government territory in surprise counter attack," Contained, October 2, 2017.

[xviii] "ISIS siege of Deir ez-Zor lifted thanks to Russian prowl missile strike – Defense Ministry," Russian federation Today, September 5, 2017.

[19] "Iran attempts to expand control through Syria equally ISIS nears defeat," USA Today, June 13, 2017.

[20] "ISIS militants came with a striking listing, left Syrian town in a trail of blood," CBC News, Oct 23, 2017.

[21] "Syrian army captures Mayadin from ISIS near Deir ez-Zor," Rudaw, October 14, 2017.

[22] James Masters, "Syria's largest oil field captured by US-backed forces," CNN, October 23, 2017.

[23] Author interview, U.S. Department of Defense force and U.S. State Department officials, August 2017.

[24] "Iraqi forces 'attack final IS bastion on Syrian arab republic border,'" BBC, September 19, 2017.

[25] "Iraqi security forces retake al-Qaim from Islamic Land: PM," Reuters, Nov 3, 2017.

[26] "Syrian army ousts 'IS' from Albu Kamal, last urban stronghold in country," Deutsche Welle, November eight, 2017.

[27] Asaad H. Almohammad and Anne Speckhard, "Is ISIS Moving its Capital from Raqqa to Mayadin in Deir ez-Zor?" International Center for the Study of Violent Radicalization, April 3, 2017.

[28] "Syria disharmonize: Raqqa'south civilians foresee last days of Isis," Financial Times, April 3, 2017.

[29] Michael R. Gordon, "ISIS Leaders Are Fleeing Raqqa, U.S. Military machine Says," New York Times, March eight, 2017.

[30] Ben Hubbard and Eric Schmitt, "ISIS, Despite Heavy Losses, Still Inspires Global Attacks," New York Times, July eight, 2017.

[31] Nancy Okail, "ISIS'due south Unprecedented Entrada Promoting Sinai," Huffington Postal service, May 13, 2017.

[32] Caleb Weiss, "Turkistan Islamic Party parades in northwestern Syria," FDD's Long State of war Journal, November 5, 2017.

[33] Mohamed Mostafa, "Islamic State second-in-command killed in airstrike, Iraqi intelligence says," Iraqi News, April 2, 2017.

[34] "Final military defeat of ISIS volition come in Euphrates River valley: coalition," Rudaw, August 24, 2017.

[35] "Syria war: Stranded IS convoy reaches Deir al-Zour," BBC, September xiv, 2017; "Daesh release Hezbollah fighter as convoy arrives in Deir al-Zor," Reuters, September xiv, 2017; Rob Nordland and Eric Schmitt, "Why the U.S. Allowed a Convoy of ISIS Fighters to Go Free," New York Times, September 15, 2017.

[36] Jack Moore, "U.South. coalition allows ISIS convoy complimentary passage to eastern Syria," Newsweek, September 14, 2017.

[37] Writer interview, Ali Alleile, executive manager of DeirEzzor24, October 2017.

[38] Author interviews, local sources, October 2017.

[39] Mohamed Mostafa, "Iraqi ground forces recaptures beginning expanse in push for ISIS havens in Anbar," Iraqi News, September 19, 2017.

[twoscore] "Syrian army ousts 'IS' from Albu Kamal, concluding urban stronghold in state."

[41] "Terminal ISIS stronghold in Syrian arab republic, Abu Kamal, totally liberated – Syrian Army," Russia Today, November ix, 2017.

[42] Al-Naba, editions 97 and 98, series entitled "Ways to evade crusader airstrikes," September fourteen and September 21, 2017, respectively.

[43] Al- Naba, edition 94, "Aan interview with the armed services commander of Raqqa,", pages 8-9, Baronial 7, 2017, pp. eight-nine.Hassan, "The Battle for Raqqa and the challenges subsequently liberation," CTC Sentry 10:vi (2017).

[44] Al-Naba, edition 94, "An interview with the military commander of Raqqa," August 7, 2017, pp. 8-ix.

[45] Al-Naba, edition 101, "Explosive Devices," Oct 12, 2017, pp. eight-9.

[46] Ibid.

[47] "U.s.a. commander: Islamic State trying to regain initiative," Associated Printing, May 18, 2016.

[48] Hassan Hassan, "Decoding the irresolute nature of ISIL's insurgency," National, March vi, 2016.

[49] Patrick Cockburn, "Isis fights dorsum in Republic of iraq: Raid on Abu Ghraib punctures hopes of the jihadist group is in retreat," Contained, February 28, 2016.

[50] "Bombs kill nearly 150 in Syrian authorities-held cities: monitor," Reuters, May 23, 2016.

[51] Author interview, U.South. Department of State official, May 2017.

[52] Ibid.

[53] "Islamic State attacks Kurdish-held boondocks on Turkish border," Reuters, February 27, 2016.

[54] "New fears about the render of liberated areas to the control of ISIS," Al Sumaria Television set, October xviii, 2016.

[55] Martin Chulov, "Republic of iraq says Balad suicide blast is Isis try to stir up sectarian war," Guardian, July eight, 2016.

[56] Kyle Orton, "The Human Who Planned the Islamic State's Takeover of Mosul," Syrian Intifada, January 31, 2017.

[57] "Islamic State kills 31 in Iraq'southward Tikrit: security sources, medics," Reuters, April 5, 2017.

[58] Michael Knights and Alexander Mello, "Losing Mosul, Regenerating in Diyala: How the Islamic State could exploit Republic of iraq's Sectarian Tinderbox," CTC Scout nine:x (2017).

[59] Michael Knights, "Predicting the shape of Iraq'south adjacent Sunni insurgents," CTC Sentinel 10:vii (2017).

[60] "Senior Iranian Commander Reportedly Killed Battling ISIS in Syria," Haaretz, November 19, 2017.

[61] "Russia says full general killed in Syrian arab republic held senior mail in Assad'due south army," Reuters, September 27, 2017.

[62] Hassan, "The Islamic Country Later Mosul."

[63] Joby Warrick and Souad Mekhennet, "Within ISIS: Quietly preparing for the loss of the 'caliphate,'" Washington Post, July 12, 2016.

[64] Tim Lister, "Death of senior leader at al-Adnani caps bad month for ISIS," CNN, September i, 2016.

[65] "ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani Calls on Supporters to Carry Out Terror Attacks in Europe, U.S.," Middle East Media Research Institute, May 20, 2016.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Myriam Benraad, "Iraq's Tribal 'Sahwa': Its Rising and Autumn," Middle E Policy Council, March 2016.

[68] Alissa J. Rubin and Stephen Farrell, "Awakening Councils past Region," New York Times, Dec 22, 2007.

[69] "Bush will add more than xx,000 troops to Republic of iraq," CNN, January 11, 2007.

[lxx] Al-Naba, edition 43, "And lie in wait for them at every place of ambush," Baronial eighteen, 2016, p. iii.

[71] Murad Batal al-Shishani, "The Islamic State's Strategic and Tactical Program for Iraq," Jamestown Foundation, August viii, 2014.

[72] Al-Naba, edition 53, "The Rutbah raid, how the city was conquered in a few hours," November three, 2016, p. iii.

[73] Loveday Morris and Mustafa Salim, "Iraqi forces retake Rutbah from ISIS and middle Fallujah for side by side boxing," Washington Post, May 19, 2016.

[74] Al-Naba, edition 53.

[75] Writer interview, U.S. Department of Defense official, December 2017.

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Source: https://ctc.usma.edu/insurgents-again-the-islamic-states-calculated-reversion-to-attrition-in-the-syria-iraq-border-region-and-beyond/